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Abstract 
In the last 20 years, the Internet has become the site of economically and legally relevant 
objects, events and actions. More recently, there has been a flurry of innovation in the financial 
application of this technology. ‘Cyberspace’ has therefore become the source of potential risks 
to the financial system. This article builds on one of the authors’ prior work on ‘border 
problems’ in financial regulation, namely the border between the regulated and the unregulated 
and the border between national jurisdictions. This provides an entry point into a conceptual 
exploration of a third border between the ‘real world’ and ‘cyberspace’—a domain of human 
interaction that is facilitated and conditioned by digital communications systems. Accepting 
the spatial metaphor arguendo, we offer some observations on the nature of both the ‘real 
world’ and cyberspace, with an eye towards locating, raising and guarding the boundary. We 
track the evolution of the ‘cyber-sovereignty’ debate and survey the divergent approaches 
currently taken to borders in cyberspace and their correlation to the broader geopolitical map 
of the early 21st century. Based on our understanding of financial stability and systemic risk, 
we argue that sovereign states still have a unique and irreplaceable role that must be reflected 
in the emerging law of Internet jurisdiction. We conclude with a few observations on how this 
could affect the design of financial regulation in the coming decade.  
 
INTRODUCTION 
Following the Global Financial Crisis (‘GFC’), Goodhart and Lastra presented a ‘border 
problems’ metaphor to highlight two basic tensions in the regulation of financial markets. Their 
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metaphor comprised two borders: the first border between regulated and unregulated activities 
and entities, and  the second border between national jurisdictions.1 When these borders are 
crossed (whether by a regulated entity engaging in unregulated activities, an unregulated entity 
engaging in regulated activities, or a foreign entity engaging in regulated activities in the 
jurisdiction, an economy faces risks originating in unregulated spaces, with potential 
implications for both consumer protection and financial stability.  
Since the 1990s, the Internet has become integral to many economically important—and 
therefore prima facie legally relevant—objects, events and actions.2 Modern information and 
communications technology (‘ICT’) makes transacting across geographical distance quicker, 
easier, more secure, and less expensive, reducing many of the hurdles faced previously to 
trading with counter-parties based in different places. Currently, innovations in financial 
technology (‘Fintech’) are making the Internet an important channel for the delivery of 
financial services and products.3 Fintech-driven financial services are diverse, including 
finance and investment (eg, crowdfunding and peer-to-peer lending), payments, money, 
exchanges and infrastructure (eg, mobile money, virtual currencies including 
‘cryptocurrencies’, and foreign exchange), and consumer interface (eg mobile application-
based financial services).4 Many of these operate in the ‘shadow’ industry, ie in parallel to 
conventional, regulated firms. Although Fintech-based financial products and services are 
subject to existing regulations, and although existing regulations are capable of applying to 
novel socio-technological practices, the growth of Fintech could cause ‘border problems’ 
because it (i) delivers new financial products and services that have not yet been regulated (eg 
‘cryptoassets’5), (ii) utilizes new forms of business organisation that are not necessarily 
recognized by the legal system (eg, ‘distributed autonomous organisations’), and (iii) operates 
in a ‘space’ which is, by nature, non-territorial or difficult to define in terms of territorial 
jurisdiction.6 
The notion of ‘cyberspace’ itself helps to understand the potential risks posed by Internet-based 
financial services. As the term implies, cyberspace is the communications within a network of 
digital computers conceptualised as a place. In a seminal (if now dated) article,7 Johnson and 
                                                     
1 C.A.E. Goodhart and R.M. Lastra, ‘Border Problems’ (2010) 13(3) Journal of International Economic Law 705.  
2 See P. Brey, ‘The Social Ontology of Virtual Environments’ (2003) 62(1) American Journal of Economics and 
Sociology 269, 269.  
3 See D.W. Arner, J.N. Barberis, and R.P. Buckley, ‘FinTech and RegTech in a Nutshell, and the Future in a 
Sandbox’ (2017) 3(4) CFA Institute Research Foundation Briefs 1; D.W. Arner, J.N. Barberis, and R.P. Buckley, 
‘FinTech, RegTech, and the Reconceptualization of Financial Regulation’ (2017) 37 Northwestern Journal of 
Law & Business 371. 
4 See D.W. Arner, J.N. Barberis, and R.P. Buckley, ‘The Evolution of FinTech: A New Post-Crisis Paradigm?’ 
(2015) 47 Georgetown Journal of International Law 1271.  
5 See A. Blandin, A.S. Cloots, H. Hussain, M. Rauchs, R. Saleuddin, J.G. Allen, K. Cloud, and B. Zhang, ‘Global 
Cryptoasset Regulatory Landscape Study’ (Cambridge Centre for Alternative Finance, 16 April 2019), URL: 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3379219.  
6 See C. Reed, ‘Taking Sides on Technology Neutrality’ (2007) 4(3) SCRIPT-ed 263.  
7 For a critical appraisal, see eg, D. Hunter, ‘Cyberspace as Place and the Tragedy of the Digital Anticommons’ 
(2003) 91(2) California Law Review 439; M.A. Lemley, ‘Place and Cyberspace’ (2003) 91(2) California Law 
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Post argued that global computer-based communications systems cut across territorial borders, 
‘creating a new realm of human activity and undermining the feasibility […] of laws based on 
geographic boundaries.’8 This new ‘realm’ of human activity exists in something analogous to 
physical space:  
While these electronic communications play havoc with geographic boundaries, a new boundary, made 
up of screens and passwords that separate the virtual from the ‘real world’ of atoms, emerges. This new 
boundary defines a distinct Cyberspace.9 
The stronger claims of the ‘cyber-sovereignty’ literature of the 1990s have not been accepted 
in the mainstream scholarship10 while the advent of distributed ledger technology (‘DLT’) has 
added a new layer of complexity to the landscape.11 But the metaphor of place-ness has stuck, 
and it is on this notion that we wish to focus. We incorporate the notion of cyberspace into the 
‘border problems’ model by adding a third border between the ‘real world’ and ‘cyperspace’ 
(terms we define below), jand examine the impact of Fintech on conventional financial 
regulation.  
The objective of financial stability has become mainstream in the decade since the GFC, but it 
has yet to be sufficiently anchored in a legal and jurisprudential basis. Financial stability 
remains a broad and discretionary concept and the economics and legal professions have not 
reached a commonly agreed definition, even though there is consensus about its relation to the 
prevention and containment of systemic risk. Given the transnational nature of systemic risk 
generally, the pursuit of financial stability interacts awkwardly with the notion of national 
territorial jurisdiction—especially in the context of cyberspace.  
Bearing in mind this financial stability objective, the main contribution of this article is the 
development of a conceptual framework for the regulation of Internet-based financial services. 
We draw on an interdisciplinary approach that combines financial law, regulatory theory, social 
ontology, and, more peripherally, transnational legal theory and critical studies of legal 
geography. The framework that emerges also provides an inroad into the broader ‘Internet 
jurisdiction’ debate. 
The article, which integrates the third border in financial regulation with the complexities of 
cyberspace jurisdiction, is divided into six sections following this introduction. First, we 
provide some context by discussing the nature of ‘financial cartography’, or the landscape that 
our borders are imposed upon. This section is important because it explains  what the three 
                                                     
Review 521. Hunter provides a detailed history of the first decade of the early years of ‘cyberspace as a place’ and 
we will not repeat that here.  
8 D.R. Johnson and D.G. Post, ‘Law and Borders—The Rise of Law in Cyberspace’ (1996) 48(5) Stanford Law 
Review 1367.  
9 ibid.  
10 See C. Reed, Making Laws for Cyberspace (Oxford 2012), 7, citing inter alia J. Goldsmith and T. Wu, Who 
Controls the Internet? Illusions of a Borderless World (Oxford 2006), 142.  
11 See generally Primavera De Filippi and Aaron Wright, Blockchain and the Law: The Rule of Code (Harvard 
University Press 2018).  
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borders borders are and why they are important. We then elaborate on what we have identified 
as the two ‘known borders’, highlighting the relevant features that we think will help us to 
understand the posited third border. In particular, we explain what we understand by ‘regulated 
activities’, ‘regulated entities’, and ‘territorial jurisdiction’. We then introduce our third border 
and, in order to do so, set out a conception of ‘cyberspace’. The penultimate section explores 
how the border between ‘cyberspace’ and the ‘real world’ operates in the important context of 
financial services, and how it might be guarded against systemic risk. We conclude with some 
recommendations and questions for further research.  
 
SOME OBSERVATIONS ON FINANCIAL CARTOGRAPHY 
Before mapping our borders, it is convenient to consider the ‘topography’ that they transect. 
Fundamentally, the borders are under constant pressure because applicable regulation penalises 
those within the regulated space, relative to those outside it, causing substitution flows towards 
the unregulated space. According to Goodhart and Lastra:  
If regulation is effective, it will constrain [those engaging in regulated activities] from achieving their 
preferred, unrestricted position, often by lowering their profitability and their return on capital. So the returns 
achievable in the regulated sector are likely to fall relative to those available on substitutes outside of it. There 
will be a switch of business from the regulated to the unregulated. In order to protect their own business, 
those in the regulated sector will seek to open up connected operations in the non-regulated sector to enable 
them to catch the better opportunities there.12 
The topography of markets is such that, like water, financial activity flows downhill and around 
high points. For example, commercial banks opened up associated conduits, structured 
investment vehicles, and hedge funds, which contributed to the GFC. This pressure has perhaps 
increased with the enhanced burden of compliance following the GFC, and the means of border 
crossing have potentially increased. Like territorial waters in international maritime law, 
borders are often the source of conflicts. 
As an example of the pressure behind substitution flows, our recent analysis pointed to so-
called ‘virtual currencies’ as a new frontier of financial activity: ‘virtual currency’ schemes 
may constitute ‘grey’ currency issues, securities issues, and payment rails, for example, 
operating in parallel to regulated financial services. 13 The sale of equity-like tokens in Initial 
Coin Offerings (‘ICOs’) as a substitute for conventional debt or equity securities saw a massive 
flow of capital into early stage ventures in 2017, many of which effectively circumvented 
                                                     
12 Goodhart and Lastra, n 1 above, 706. See also C.A.E. Goodhart, ‘The Boundary Problem in Financial 
Regulation’ (2008) 206 National Institute Economic Review 48. 
13 R.M. Lastra and J.G. Allen, ‘Virtual Currencies in the Eurosystem: challenges ahead’ prepared for the 
Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs of the European Parliament (ECON) as an input for the Monetary 
Dialogue of 9 July 2018 between ECON and the President of the European Central Bank 
(http://www.europarl.europa.eu/committees/en/econ/monetary-dialogue.html). Also published as R.M. Lastra 
and J.G. Allen, ‘Virtual Currencies in the Eurosystem: Challenges Ahead’ (2019) 52(2) The International Lawyer 
177. See Libra Association, An Introduction to Libra (18 July 2019), URL: See https://libra.org/en-US/white-
paper/?noredirect=en-US.  
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capital markets and consumer protection requirements such as prospectus disclosure and 
corporate governance (eg, listing) standards that would otherwise have applied. 
‘Cryptocurrency’-based financial services are also frequently concentrated in permissive 
jurisdictions, from where they aim to service consumers in more strictly regulated markets.14 
Although we concluded that the overall size of the ‘crypto’ market was probably not yet 
systemic, there are significant incentives for institutional money to flow into the new crypto-
token based financial economy, and we recommended that regulators remain vigilant, and the 
recent Libra proposal has borne out our analysis.15 Another example comes from the rise in 
peer-to-peer lending and other ‘informal’ financial arrangements in China. As Braggion, 
Manconi and Zhu explain, Fintech-based peer-to-peer lending such as that over the RenrenDai 
platform may have helped to circumvent loan-to-value mortgage caps in recent years.16 
The relation between the borders  
As our analysis unfolds, the second border will appear as an outgrowth of the first. Financial 
regulation (ultimately) takes place at a national level, but financial activity is transnational, so 
national financial systems are inherently vulnerable to the effect of actions taken outside the 
jurisdiction. Supra-national rules, such as those found in the European Union, are still supra-
national—they are derived from the communication and agreement between nation states. 
Entities that are unregulated because they are foreign are a category of unregulated entities. 
Again, incentives exist for those providing financial products and services to base themselves 
in a less regulated jurisdiction and, from there, to access more regulated markets where they 
will enjoy a comparative advantage.  
The third border is an aspect of the first, as well: Activities that take place in (apparently non-
jurisdictional) cyberspace are just a sub-set of (nationally) unregulated activities. However, just 
as the national border adds some explanatory power to the metaphor, ie, by allowing us to 
isolate the relevant issues of national jurisdiction versus international financial transactions, 
the third border highlights the relevant issues conventional regulators face when attempting to 
govern objects, events and actions in cyberspace. Chief among these are: (i) bringing 
cyberspace into a normative framework based on territorial jurisdiction and (ii) governing 
financial objects, events, and actions that are enabled by novel ICT—what Arner, Barberis, 
and Buckley call ‘FinTech 3.0’. FinTech 1.0, they argue, began with early telecommunications 
cables in the mid-19th century and ended with early digitalisation in the 1960s. FinTech 2.0 
continued until the late 2000s and was characterised by systems like Bankers’ Automated 
Clearing Services (‘BACS’), Clearing House Information Systems (‘CHIS’), and Society of 
                                                     
14 For example, a Frankfurt-based Fintech called ‘Savedroid’ was recently reported to be planning savings plans 
based in another European country for consumers in the German market. See R. Berschens, ‘EU erwägt striktere 
Regeln für Bitcoin & Co.’ (Handelsblatt, 4 September 2018), 
https://www.handelsblatt.com/finanzen/maerkte/devisen-rohstoffe/kryptowaehrungen-eu-erwaegt-striktere-
regeln-fuer-bitcoin-und-co-/22993608.html?ticket=ST-10029229-YhugI233f6vyAUTE9CLk-ap2.  
15 Lastra and Allen, n 14 above. 
16 F. Braggion, A. Manconi and H. Zhu, ‘Can Technology Undermine Macroprudential Regulation? Evidence 
from Peer-to-Peer Credit in China’ (IWFSAS, Cass Business School, 10 September 2018). Available at SSRN: 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2957411. 
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Worldwide Financial Communications (‘SWIFT’). FinTech 3.0 is characterised by novel 
objects and modes of action (such as crypto-tokens, cloud-based computing, and DLT), by 
changed business models and players (not only start-ups but also technology and 
telecommunications companies entering into the financial services sector)17 and by attempts to 
disintermediate and/or automate intermediation. This, in our view, raises challenges for 
conventional regulation which is still often based on physical documents, centralised actors 
(especially intermediaries), and centralised information repositories.  
Mapping the third border is especially difficult, however, because it requires a plausible 
account of cyberspace as a domain in which legally cognisable objects exist, legally relevant 
events take place, and legal acts (acts-in-the-law as well as legally relevant acts such as torts) 
are performed. This, we argue, is not only inherently difficult, but it can also unsettle some 
intuitive understandings of the ‘real world’. Developing such an account, however, positions 
us well to understand how the technological processes that mediate our social interactions 
inform the structure of our social world itself, including the law. Part of the effort required is 
to describe legally what Tom Boellstorff calls the ‘digital real’.18 The effort is worthwhile 
because, with such an understanding, we can respond more intelligently and proactively to new 
forms of financial activity in the coming decades.  
 
THE KNOWN BORDERS 
The two borders discussed by Goodhart and Lastra are familiar subject matter; lawyers are 
used to categorising the world of possible objects, events and actions as ‘regulated’ and 
‘unregulated’, with reference to the first border, and, using the second border, to carving the 
world up into so many national ‘jurisdictions’ (ie, spheres in which legal rules apply or have 
force). In this Section, we discuss both of these ‘known borders’, beginning first with what we 
mean by ‘regulated activity’, ‘regulated entity’, and—because it is essential to understanding 
how law behaves spatially—by ‘jurisdiction’.   
Regulated activities and entities  
The term ‘regulated’ is predicated of both activities and entities. The primary implication of 
something being a ‘regulated activity’ is one of modal logic; a regulated activity is one that is 
permitted subject to conditions—which is to say it is sometimes prohibited, and possibly 
sometimes obligatory, but neither prohibited nor obligatory in all cases. It is tautological that 
everything which is not prohibited is permitted. Generally, the default mode in a free market 
economic order is permissive rather than prohibitive. However, due to the potentially harmful 
nature of some activities, the default mode is sometimes prohibition. In such cases, a positive 
                                                     
17 See Arner, Barberis and Buckley, above n 4, 1278 et seq. Much of the current banking system still relies on 
Fintech 1.0 infrastructure. As we explain below, there is some overlap between FinTech 2.0 and FinTech 3.0, as 
the later stages of the former utilised Internet-based ICT.  
18 See T. Boellstorff, ‘For Whom the Ontology Turns: Theorizing the Digital Real’ (2016) 57(4) Current 
Anthropology 387.  
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permission (eg, a ‘licence’) is required, which is generally granted to a certain entity on terms. 
Driving is an activity that is prohibited except for licensed drivers. Lending to consumers is 
another. This is usually what is meant by ‘regulated activities’ in the financial services 
context—to be more precise, ‘prima facie prohibited activity permissible with a license’. The 
terms ‘licence’, ‘charter’, ‘authorisation’ (associated with the ‘entry into the business’ of 
commercial banks, for example)19 indicate an exercise of government authority that has a 
sovereign-like character, in contrast to registration procedures which can be characterized as 
market regulation mechanisms that give ‘access to the business’.  
What does it mean for an entity, then, as distinct from an activity, to be regulated? In usage, it 
is usually the ‘positive permission’ sense that is intended. Saying that an entity is regulated is 
more likely to imply that the activity in question is prima facie prohibited, that a positive 
permission (licence) is required, and that the entity has been licensed such that it is permitted 
to do what others may not. So a regulated entity is either one with a positive permission or the 
kind of entity that engages in activities that are ‘regulated’ in the sense of being subject to 
oversight. 
What is less obvious when we say that an activity is regulated is the implicit proposition that 
the activity is possible in the first place (by the relevant entity). In his seminal work, Lawrence 
Lessig discusses the constraints and affordances of the ‘architecture’ of the relevant world.20 
There was no point in saying that flying was regulated until flight became a technological 
possibility in the 20th century; there was no point in saying that unmanned flight was regulated 
until drones became a possibility in the 21st century. ICT makes new forms of activity possible, 
too. This leads to a very important point: The law responds to developments, often technology-
led, which expand the horizons of what is possible; once the space of the possible has expanded, 
the law has to determine whether the space of the permitted expands with it or remains more 
constrained. Whether constraint takes the form of the extension of an existing regulation or the 
creation of a new one is of secondary importance. The idea of technology neutral regulation, 
then, is regulation that is broad enough to cover outcomes enabled by new technology without 
the need for reform. In this, the challenge is always to determine whether technology allows 
new forms of action, or simply provides new ways of doing old things.  
‘Fintech’ follows a deep pattern in the history of finance, namely of new technologies (eg the 
printing press, DLT) enabling new forms of market activity to which the law must respond 
dynamically. As Katharina Pistor argues, the world of finance is legally constructed in a 
                                                     
19 In the UK, no person can carry on ‘regulated activities’ by way of business unless authorised or exempt (section 
19, Financial Services and Markets Act, FSMA). The regulated activities are specified in the FSMA (Regulated 
Activities) Order 2001 (RAO). Any firm that wants to be a bank (carrying on the regulated activity of accepting 
deposits) must be authorised to do this by the Prudential Regulation Authority (PRA). In the euro area, the ECB 
is exclusively competent to authorise credit institutions according to Article 4.1(a) of the SSM Regulation 
(Council Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013 of 15 October 2013 conferring specific tasks on the European Central 
Bank concerning policies relating to the prudential supervision of credit institutions). In the USA, national banks 
are chartered by the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency. 
20 See L. Lessig, Code version 2.0 (Basic Books 2006); L. Lessig, Code and Other Laws of Cyberspace (Basic 
Books 1999).  
8 
 
‘dynamic process in which the rules of the game are continuously challenged by new 
contractual devices, which in turn seek legal vindication.’21 Increasingly, these ‘contractual 
devices’ rest on forms of action enabled by novel ICT. The significance of this appears when 
we come to explore cyberspace as a site of actions, including novel financial transactions, that 
are not possible in the physical world. Behaviour in online spaces can be controlled not just by 
the modality of law but by the constraints of architecture that makes certain forms of action 
possible or impossible. This observation both promises new forms of liberal regulation in 
digital environments and warns of new forms of authoritarian control. This is one further reason 
why the debate about Internet jurisdiction is so important.    
Territorial jurisdiction 
The second border embodies the concept of sovereignty, as anchored in territorial jurisdiction. 
Broadly stated, a jurisdiction is a context in which some set of rules applies, and generally in 
which some institution is authorised by those rules to enforce them. Although the term is 
ubiquitous, the concept of jurisdiction continues to bedevil theorists.22  
Jurisdiction becomes important when parties transact across borders. The rule-set of 
Jurisdiction A may treat objects, events, and actions differently to the rule-set of Jurisdiction 
B, and by definition each jurisdiction has different institutions of authority to make, interpret, 
and apply its rules. The aspect on which we wish to focus in our paper is captured well by the 
German term Geltungsbereich—that is the area [Bereich] in which laws gelten, which means 
to be valid and in force.23  
Some communities operate with a notion of personal jurisdiction.24 There, the context in which 
a rule-set applies is derived by ancestry or religion or oath of allegiance. But, perhaps because 
human communities (traditionally) occupy physical space and (often) claim exclusive law-
making power over that space, modern conceptions of jurisdiction have a territorial basis. 
Territorial jurisdictions are defined by reference to geographical coordinates, be they natural 
landmarks or man-made lines on the earth’s surface. Jurisdiction also extends into the earth 
and into the air, but only to a certain extent—no country can realistically claim a wedge of the 
universe extending from its surface ad infinitum .25 Systems of purely personal jurisdiction are 
rare; more common are spheres of personal jurisdiction under the aegis of a territorial 
sovereign, such as the status of Jews in the Holy Roman Empire or under the Ottoman millet 
                                                     
21 K. Pistor, ‘A Legal Theory of Finance’ (2013) 41 Journal of Comparative Economics 315, 316.  
22 F.A. Mann’s classical conception of jurisdiction in international law is one of the inherent power of a state to 
regulate conduct, such power comprising the authority to legislate and the authority to enforce. See F.A. Mann, 
‘The Doctrine of Jurisdiction in International Law’ (1964) 111 Recuil des Cours 1.  
23 We lack a cognate in English: E. Bulygin, ‘Valid Law and Law in Force’ in E. Bulygin (C. Bernal et al eds.), 
Essays in Legal Philosophy (Oxford 2015), 285.  
24 For example, Malaysia applies syariah law to Muslims only under Article 121(1A) of the Constitution of 
Malaysia.  
25 On airspace sovereignty generally see A.I. Moon Jr., ‘A Look at Airspace Sovereignty’ (1963) 29 Journal of 
Air Law & Commerce 328.  
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system.26 Extra-territorial and even universal jurisdiction is of course claimed by states in 
certain contexts, but rather as an exception than as a rule.27 In our view, the personal extra-
territorial jurisdiction claimed by states is a promising starting point from which to consider 
jurisdiction in cyberspace. 
The paradigm example of territorial jurisdiction is the ‘Westphalian sovereign state’, a form of 
geo-political ordering in which one community claims to possess sole law-making power over 
a defined territory, which means that it is (i) superior to any other rule-generating organisation 
within the territory and (ii) independent of any rule-generating organ outside the territory but 
(iii) makes no claims (in the ordinary case) to generate valid rules outside the territory. 
Intuitively, when we think of jurisdiction today we tend to think of states—thereby taking 
territorial jurisdiction for granted. Sovereignty is defined as the supreme authority within a 
territory, and the state is defined as the set of political institutions in which sovereignty is 
embodied.28 
Because of this, territorial jurisdictions appear intuitively as parts of the earth, parts of the ‘real 
world’ or, as Johnson and Post put it, the ‘world of atoms’.29 Of course, this is not the case; a 
territory is a set of geographical coordinates projected onto the world of atoms;30  the state is 
no more a given feature of the natural world than a centimetre or a country club.31 The artificial, 
even quasi-abstract nature of nation states thus forms a major theme in this article.32  
The ontic furniture33 of our world sometimes makes more sense if we start with less grandiose 
examples than the nation state. Let us take some examples of ‘jurisdiction’ writ small, such as 
                                                     
26 See eg K. Barley and G. Gavrilis, ‘The Ottoman Millet System: Non-Territorial Autonomy and its 
Contemporary Legacy’ (2016) 15(1) Ethnopolitics 24; R. Gechtman, ‘Jews and Non-Territorial Autonomy: 
Political Programmes and Historical Perspectives’ (2016) 15(1) Ethnopolitics 66.   
27 See ‘Singapore warns citizens against legal cannabis use overseas’ (New Straits Times, 27 October 2018), 
https://www.nst.com.my/world/2018/10/425482/singapore-warns-citizens-against-legal-cannabis-use-overseas.  
28 For further discussion, see R.M. Lastra, International Financial and Monetary Law (Oxford University Press 
2015), ch 1. 
29 Johnson and Post, above n 8, 1368 
30 See generally B. Smith, ‘On Drawing Lines on a Map’ in A.U. Frank, W. Kuhn and D.M. Mark (eds.), Spatial 
Information Theory: Proceedings of COSIT ’95 (Springer 1995). 
31 On the ontology of the state, see eg D. Tan, ‘The Metaphysics of Statehood’ (2018) 31(2) Canadian Journal of 
Law & Jurisprudence 403. See also Joseph Raz, ‘Why the State’ and D. von Daniels, ‘A Genealogical Perspective 
on Pluralist Jurisprudence’ in N. Roughan and A. Halpin (eds.), In Pursuit of Pluralist Jurisprudence (Cambridge 
2017), ch 7 and ch 8 respectively. See also C. von Bar, Gemeineuropäisches Sachenrecht (C.H. Beck 2015), para 
[186] for a parallel discussion in the private law of property.  
32 See eg, E.H. Robinson, ‘A Documentary Theory of States and Their Existence as Quasi-Abstract Entities’ 
(2014) 19(3) Geopolitics 461. There is a significant critical literature on the artificial nature of borders. See eg, 
A. Kaushal, ‘The Politics of Jurisdiction’ (2015) 78(5) Modern Law Review 759; A. Shachar, The Shifting Border: 
Legal Cartographies of Migration and Mobility (forthcoming Manchester University Press 2020); S.D. 
McDowell, P.E. Steinberg, and T.K. Tomasello, Managing the Infosphere: Governance, Technology, and 
Cultural Practice in Motion (Temple University Press 2007); L. Volpp, ‘Imaginings of Space in Immigration 
Law’ (2012) Law, Culture and the Humanities 1. 
33 See U. Mäki, ‘Scientific Realism as a Challenge to Economics (and Vice Versa)’ (2011) 18(1) Journal of 
Economic Methodology 1, 8; see also U. Mäki, ‘Scientific Realism and some Peculiarities of Economics’ in R.S. 
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the eruv, which allows us to bracket out considerations of institutional competence and the 
external aspect of sovereignty and to focus on jurisdiction as a legally-constituted social 
delimitation of physical space. An eruv is an urban area demarcated within a larger urban area 
by means of a boundary, usually marked by given landmarks such as telephone poles, by some 
sort of wall or fence or by virtue of its topography.34 The purpose of an eruv is to turn an area 
according to Jewish law into a ‘private’ domain, instead of a ‘public’ one, such that certain 
prohibitions (eg, of carrying objects outside the private domain on Shabbat) do not apply. An 
eruv is specific to the community that creates it; communities from the same city that follow 
different traditions may not regard each other’s eruv as kosher. It is an invisible border, defined 
by reference to landmarks, that has important deontic consequences, specifically enlarging the 
scope of permissible actions for those that create it. Similarly, so-called cippi stones mark the 
pomerium of ancient Rome. This line was originally (probably) a defensive wall, but by 
classical times it had already come to assume symbolic function. The pomerium played an 
important role in the legal and religious life of the city, closely entangled as they were. To stay 
with a prohibition on carrying, citizens were not allowed to carry arms within the pomerium.35  
These two geographically-defined social spaces differ in important respects, but both are 
community-specific,36 and both are connected to the physical world in an essential, rather than 
a casual way, because they are intended to divide and mark the space in which a community 
lives. Moreover, both fall squarely within the social part of our world, not the world of atoms.37 
Territorial jurisdictions are themselves defined in legal terms; as Peer Zumbansen notes, spaces 
of legal norm-creation may be defined by geographical territory, but they are demarcated by 
boundaries that are inseparable from the association of that space with a particular institutional 
infrastructure.38 
If jurisdiction is not just a straightforward division of physical space, might it not interact with 
non-spatial ‘places’ such as ‘cyberspace’? Consonant with the borders metaphor, the following 
sections of this article explore cyberspace as a new kind of ‘territory’ in which legal notions of 
                                                     
Cohen, R. Hilpinen, and Q. Renzong (eds), Realism and Anti-Realism in the Philosophy of Science (Kluwer 1996).  
34 See B. Smith, ‘On Place and Space: The Ontology of the Eruv’ in C. Kanzian (ed.), Cultures: Conflict—
Analysis—Dialogue: Proceedings of the 29 International Ludwig Wittgenstein Symposium (Ontos 2007), 403. See 
also M. Rapoport, ‘Creating Place, Creating Community: The Intangible Boundaries of the Jewish “Eruv”’ (2011) 
29(5) Environment and Planning D: Society and Space 891; B. Smith and L. Zaibert, ‘Real Estate: The 
Foundations of the Ontology of Property’ in H. Stuckenschmidt, E. Stubkjaer, and C. Schlieder (eds.), The 
Ontology and Modelling of Real Estate Transactions (Ashgate 2003).  
35 See S.B. Platner (T. Ashby ed.), A Topographical Dictionary of Ancient Rome (Oxford University Press 1929), 
‘pomerium’.  
36 On the type of intersubjective intentionality founding groups, see R. Tuomela, Social Ontology: Collective 
Intentionality and Group Agents (Oxford University Press 2013), 220.  
37 See D.G. Post, ‘How the Internet is making jurisdiction sexy (again)’ (2017) 25 International Journal of Law 
and Information Technology 249, 250; see broadly J. Searle, Making the Social World (Oxford University Press 
2010), 3.  
38 P. Zambunsen, ‘The Regulatory Landscape of Global Governance and Transnational Legal Authority’ in G. 
Handl, J. Zekoll and P. Zumbansen (eds.), Beyond Territoriality: Transnational Legal Authority in an Age of 
Globalization (Brill 2012), 551. 
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jurisdiction might operate, or at least  interact. As Mariana Valverde observes, interdisciplinary 
legal studies are too often unidirectional; they seek to ‘save’ law from sterile doctrinalism by 
subjecting it to the latest in social theory without asking how legal scholarship might cross-
fertilise those other disciplines.39 In the remainder of this section, we seek to explore how legal 
concepts—in this case, jurisdiction—might help to explain cyberspace itself. 
A brief review of sovereignty and territoriality 
Because the regulation of cyberspace entails the extension of claims of sovereign authority into 
a new ‘territory’, it is convenient to reflect briefly on the relationship between sovereignty and 
territory, which are essentially coupled in the Westphalian paradigm. J.H. Jackson cites the 
conventional position as described by a US official:  
Historically, sovereignty has been associated with four main characteristics: First, a sovereign state is 
one that enjoys supreme political authority and monopoly over the legitimate use of force within its 
territory. Second, it is capable of regulating movements across its borders. Third, it can make its foreign 
policy choices freely. Finally, it is recognized by other governments as an independent entity entitled to 
freedom from external intervention.40  
These four attributes—internal authority, border control, policy autonomy, and non-
intervention—are all being challenged in unprecedented ways. One of them is surely the 
aspects of ‘globalisation’ facilitated by quick, cheap, and reliable Internet-based 
communications. The innovations of the digital age have accentuated the limitations of 
sovereignty to deal with the globalisation of financial markets. Its traditional attributes are 
inadequate to deal with financial conglomerates, complex groups and, generally, with cross 
border institutions and markets.41  
At first blush, the concept of sovereignty would appear ill-suited to non-territorial contexts, 
which is probably why the cyber-sovereignty movement adopted a spatial metaphor to 
understand Internet communications in the first place. From a more conventional statist 
perspective, control over the actions of Internet participants would seem to be a matter solely 
for the territorial sovereigns under which those participants (physically) live, or a matter of 
personal jurisdiction asserted extra-territorially.  
We think that a more nuanced concept of sovereignty will emerge as theories of Internet 
jurisdiction unfold. Too often, classical legal concepts are taken as ahistorical. This can lead to 
an anachronistic view of those concepts themselves. One feature of the intellectual history 
instructive in this context is the role of technologies used for representing reality. According 
to Jordan Branch, advances in cartography pre-dated and causally influenced conceptions of 
                                                     
39 M. Valverde, ‘Analysing the Governance of Security: Jurisdiction and Scale’ (2008) 1 Behemoth: A Journal on 
Civilisation 3, 5.  
40 J.H. Jackson, ‘Sovereignty—Modern: A New Approach to an Outdated Concept’ (2003) 97 American Journal 
of International Law 782, 786, citing R.N. Haass.  
41 T. Cottier, J.H. Jackson and R.M. Lastra, International Law and Financial Regulation in Monetary Affairs 
(Oxford University Press, 2012), 417, 419. 
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‘sovereign space’. Mapping technology made the notion of absolute, homogenous sovereign 
territories with contiguous, non-overlapping borders possible long before rulers actually 
asserted modern territorial sovereignty. Sovereign territories were conceptualised and 
represented as non-contiguous ‘islands’ of authority based around towns and cities; 
overlapping zones and interstitial spaces were common.42  
Paradoxically, international private law is generally interpreted, from the perspective of 
Western modernity, through the lens of sovereign territorial jurisdiction and comity between 
nations. But the system—and much of the substance—of international private law evolved 
during the middle ages when no nation states existed, and when debates about sovereignty were 
between the Holy Roman Emperor and the Pope.43 (Only later did European princes adopt the 
rhetoric of absolute power to bolster their claims for regional independence in matters of 
religion and more broadly; later still the rhetoric was taken up in the name of the ‘people’).44 
The background assumption by all the classical medieval works on the conflict of laws, whose 
substantive work early modern and then modern writers more or less adopted, was of a 
universal ius commune—the choice of law rules guided choices between the particular rule-
sets that formed islands in a sea of interstitial common law.  
Technologies, then, both undermine conventional concepts and enable rulers to stake new 
claims. Today, the role of local and ‘private’ organisations and the possibility of interstitial 
spaces are characteristic features of cyberspace.45 The development of cyberspace may create 
the need to consider the notion of sovereignty independently of territory and, according to some 
views, requires the developments of a body of transnational law.46  
In his seminal examination of the concept of sovereignty, Jackson offers a modern concept that 
moves away from the traditional notion of the state monopoly on power and focuses instead on 
the allocation of legal authority: ‘[W]hen someone argues that the United States should not 
accept a treaty because that treaty infringes upon US sovereignty, what the person most often 
means is that he or she believes a certain set of decisions should be made, as a matter of good 
governmental policy, at the nation-state (US) level, and not at the international level.’47 This 
approach rightly focuses on the human institutions to which authority over a certain subject-
                                                     
42 J. Branch, ‘Mapping the Sovereign State: Technology, Authority, and Systemic Change’ (2011) 65(1) 
International Organisation 1.  
43 J. Gordley, ‘Extra-Territorial Legal Problems in a World Without Nations: What the Medieval Jurists Could 
Teach Us’ in in G. Handl, J. Zekoll and P. Zumbansen (eds.), Beyond Territoriality: Transnational Legal 
Authority in an Age of Globalization (Brill 2012), 35, 41.  
44 See broadly M. Wilks, The Problem of Sovereignty in the Later Middle Ages: The Papal Monarchy with 
Augustinus Triumphus and the Publicists (Cambridge 1963).  
45 See eg E. Noor, ‘The fuzzy logic of cyberspace’ (New Straits Times, 2 June 2007), 
https://www.nst.com.my/opinion/columnists/2017/06/244959/fuzzy-logic-cyberspace.  
46 However see T. Forsberg, ‘Beyond Sovereignty, Within Territoriality: Mapping the Space of the Late-Modern 
(Geo) Politics’ (1996) 31(4) Cooperation and Conflict 355. 
47 Jackson, above n 40, 791.  
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matter ought to be allocated.48 In the context of cyberspace, Jackson’s analysis suggests that 
we need a sensitivity to the possibilities of governance at the national, but also international 
and sub-national level. This multi-level governance approach—which has been applied in the 
field of trade—is particularly suitable for the regulation of modern financial markets.49  
Central to the question of power-allocation is the question of legitimacy, of why this institution, 
rather than that one, is tasked with creating and/or enforcing rules in a particular domain of 
social life. Reed and Murray suggest that each state, in addition to the community of residents 
in its territory, has an extended community in cyberspace—as they engage in different online 
activities, individuals enter and leave different extended communities.50 To the extent that the 
source of the law’s authority is the political will of the community it regulates, then, 
cyberspace-based communities can indeed generate legitimate normative systems. Conversely, 
territorial sovereigns can make legitimate claims on Internet-based actors regardless of their 
physical location, provided certain conditions of legitimacy are met.  
In the European Union, the principle of subsidiarity in turn operates to guide these sorts of 
decisions; authority should be delegated to the institutions closest to the people actually subject 
to the authority. Adopting a framework of cyber-subsidiarity, instead of cyber-sovereignty, 
would in our opinion serve the agenda of reasonable Internet libertarians better, and may help 
the rest of us achieve a rational governance structure for cyberspace as well. Subsidiarity is a 
fundamental piece in the design of Europe’s multi-level governance system of financial 
regulation. Cyber-subsidiarity could thus provide an anchor for a ‘third way’ in the regulation 
of cyberspace in general and Fintech in particular, a third way which is different from the statist 
interventionist model on the one hand and from the purely libertarian and commercial approach 
on the other hand.51  
 
THE THIRD BORDER: CYBERSPACE 
As an environment framed by physical and non-physical components, including a global 
network of digital computers accessible remotely, cyberspace poses an implicit challenge to 
the state-centric ideas of global governance.52 Many early accounts described cyberspace as a 
realm completely apart from physical reality, in order to bolster a claim of cyber-sovereignty. 
The thrust of Johnson and Post’s 1996 argument, for example, was that the assertion of 
territorial jurisdiction over Internet-based information flows could not govern cyberspace 
                                                     
48 Reed, above n 10, 25.  
49 Cottier, Jackson and Lastra, above n 41, 413, 415 and ch 8; see also T. Cottier, ‘Constitutionalism, Multilevel 
Trade Governance and Social Regulation’ (2006) 10(2) Journal of International Economic Law 554.  
50 C. Reed and A. Murray, Rethinking the Jurisprudence of Cyberspace (Edward Elgar 2018), 18.  
51 J. Thornhill, ‘There is a third way for Europe to navigate the digital world’, Financial Times, 19 November 
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52 A.N. Liaropoulos, ‘Cyberspace Governance and State Sovereignty’ in G.C. Bitros and N.C. Kyriazis (eds.), 
Democracy and an Open-Economy World Order (Springer 2017), 25.  
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effectively.53 This ontological ‘place-ness’ argument served the normative argument that 
cyberspace ought to be allowed to create its own normative order(s), and that ‘virtual 
jurisdictions’ ought to be treated like territorial jurisdictions in being allowed to create 
divergent rule-sets. Perhaps because commentators have tended to conflate the descriptive 
aspect of the metaphor and its normative implications, the notion of cyberspace as a place has 
remained controversial.54 As long as its limitations as a metaphor are acknowledged, however, 
we think it is descriptively useful, and that it does not commit us to such a normative project.  
Positions in the contemporary Internet jurisdiction debate offer different answers to the 
questions whether Internet-based activities should be governed at all and who should govern 
them (particularly, what role different actors including firms, non-governmental organisations, 
nation states, and supra-national organisations should play in that governance). Views range 
from Internet anarchism to the complete subordination of the Internet to national jurisdiction 
through the creation of national Intranets.55 Taking a multi-lateral governance approach, 
conventional state sovereigns have a distinct and essential role to play, but a legitimate role 
exists for private and quasi-public actors, as well.56 In our view, national ‘law spaces’ will 
remain important in the sphere of financial regulation, and this makes it crucial to map the 
relation between conventional territorial jurisdictions and cyberspace.  
Our main objective is to present a set of methodological considerations that we think frame the 
debate in the context of financial services. The starting point, again, is cyberspace qua place. 
Returning to Johnson and Post, the ‘new boundary’, they claimed, ‘is real’: 
Traditional legal doctrine treats the Net as a mere transmission medium that facilitates the exchange of 
messages sent from one legally significant geographical location to another, each of which has its own 
applicable laws. But trying to tie the laws of any particular territorial sovereign to transactions on the 
Net, or even trying to analyse the legal consequences of Net-based commerce as if each transaction 
occurred geographically somewhere in particular, is most unsatisfying. A more legally significant, and 
satisfying, border for the ‘law space’ of the Net consists of the screens and passwords that separate the 
tangible from the intangible world… There is a ‘placeness’ to Cyberspace because the messages used 
there are persistent and accessible to many people.57 
It is helpful, again, to reject the opposition of ‘cyberspace’ and the ‘world of atoms’ to the 
extent it encourages an opposition of the ‘digital’ and the ‘real’. A large part of the real is 
                                                     
53 See Johnson and Post, above n 8, 1370-1378. See contra J.L. Goldsmith, ‘Against Cyberanarchy’ (1998) 65 
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54 Hunter, above n 7, 443; Johnson and Post, above n 8, 1387, 1400. 
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digital, and is now ‘located’ in cyberspace; the border between cyberspace and the real world 
is not a border between an informational domain and a physical domain, but between official 
projections of legal and economic institutional reality and an undefined mass of online social 
interactions of uncertain legal status (from the point of view of any legal system). To 
understand this border, it is necessary (i) to understand the nature of conventional legal reality 
and (ii) to understand the physical footprint of cyberspace and its users. We will take those 
questions in order, dealing with (ii) in the next section. Here, we set out our framework for 
understanding conventional legal reality.  
In one of the first efforts to describe the ontology of cyberspace with a legal focus, David 
Koepsell rightly observed that the ontology of the law has not yet been adequately theorised.58 
How is it that invisible, intangible objects such as legal rights or digital financial records 
assume ‘reality’? How are they created and maintained, and how are they distinguished from, 
for example, ‘rights’ and ‘duties’ in a game, or electronic ‘money’ and ‘securities’ on a 
simulated trading platform?59 Most of law’s stock-in-trade is invisible: you can’t pack a right 
in a box; as Coffee put it, a corporation has ‘No Soul to Damn: No Body to Kick’.60 When a 
regime changes, entities—from land titles to public debt instruments to units of money—are 
liable simply to disappear with it (subject to rules of state succession). The same is true of 
borders: one of us walks past Checkpoint Charlie every day. 
The socially-constituted objects, which are often themselves intangible, exist because we 
document their existence—with treaties, lease agreements, marriage certificates, letters patent, 
debentures, certificates of incorporation, acts of parliament, judgments, affidavits, and tax 
assessments, we create vast and complex structures within institutional legal reality.61 Barry 
Smith argues, in terms that mirror Johnson and Post’s emphasis:  
A document is something that is able to endure self-identically through time. It can be signed and 
countersigned, stored, registered, inspected, conveyed, copied, ratified, nullified, stamped, forged, 
hidden, lost or destroyed. Pluralities of documents can be chained together … and combined in other 
ways to form new document-complexes, whose structures mirror underlying human relations for 
example of debtor to creditor, of manager to shareholder, of customer to supplier… Documents thereby 
make possible new kinds of enduring social relations and new kinds of enduring social entities together 
allowing the evolution of entire new dimensions of socio-economic reality.62 
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Even territorial jurisdictions are created (and changed) through speech-acts, usually recorded 
in documents—declarations of independence, constitutions, town charters, planning 
applications, etc. These documentary utterances create the politico-legal geography of the 
world around us.63 Only in the second instance are walls and checkpoints constructed to mark 
their borders.64  
Thus, the notion that cyberspace acquires ‘place-ness’ by virtue of the fact that messages 
accessed there are persistent over time, and are accessible to many people regardless of physical 
location, may be a metaphor—but it is a useful one. As Dan Hunter has argued, evidence from 
cognitive science has convincingly demonstrated that we do actually think about cyberspace 
as a place. Even those sceptical of the place metaphor ‘find it impossible to talk about Internet 
regulation without invoking spatial references,’ and it has become common to map non-
Cartesian, abstract ‘spaces’.65 In our view, the metaphor aptly expresses the role of 
communications and documents in the ontology of social reality.66 These invisible objects, 
events, and actions structure our social lives. A significant part of our lives as human beings is 
not composed of physical interactions at all, but of institutional interactions that are mediated 
by language and made possible by the existence of rules.67 Ultimately, they help to structure 
the interactions between physical human bodies and physical objects in the world of atoms. 
What we are witnessing now is a rapid expansion in the scale of Smith’s ‘document-complexes’ 
(structured aggregations of institutional documents) riding on the back of developments in ICT. 
First computers, then computer networks (notably the Internet) and now new data structures 
within those networks (notably DLT) have made novel document-complexes possible. When 
these new document-complexes are treated as real by market participants, they assume a degree 
of social reality, just like their paper forebears.68 True, there may be ontologically relevant 
differences between paper-based and digital documents;69 we could anchor physical documents 
in the ‘real world’ (ie, the parts of social reality that we conventionally regard as self-evident) 
by virtue of their physical embodiment, and we could place digital documents in ‘cyberspace’ 
because they exist in a different medium. But it is also important to recognise that both belong 
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to a reality that is mediated and facilitated by information technology. For all the novelty of 
DLT (for example), the history of finance is full of examples of market innovation leading 
regulation, taking advantage of new technologies.70 
Current developments are challenging for the traditional paradigm of territorial regulation 
because, where paper documents have a physical existence and have to be stored somewhere, 
the Internet, cloud-based storage, and DLT attenuate the link between political geography and 
institutional legal reality. Things seem to float in a parallel realm, accessible by everyone at 
all times irrespective of their geographical location (or the jurisdiction in which that 
geographical location lies). Of course, there are physical barriers to accessing the Internet: 
More than a billion people live behind a state-imposed firewall,71 and billions still lack access 
to the internet for want of a connection, an Internet-capable device, or electricity to charge it.72 
Furthermore, the Internet has a physical footprint (server farms and undersea cables), as do its 
human users. One aspect of our border, then, would appear to be a border between abstraction 
and materially-embodied abstraction, in the sense of the point in space and time at which 
systems of symbols (ie computer languages) interact with physical hardware systems (ie 
computers).73 But this is not the same as the intuitive border between ‘cyberspace’ and the 
‘world of atoms’. The border is one between two sub-domains of technologically-mediated 
social reality. While it would be unwise to posit that cyberspace should be treated as an 
extension of a jurisdiction straightforwardly, then, cyberspace might be the context for a 
refinement or redefinition of the concept of territorial jurisdiction in the future.  
 
GUARDING THE THIRD BORDER 
Accepting the metaphor of cyberspace heuristically, we now consider how national 
jurisdictions guard themselves against risks that have their source in Internet-based financial 
activities. 
Incorporation: Border-crossing or land grab? 
As we mentioned at the outset, cyberspace provides a situs for objects, events and actions that 
are sometimes, but not always, given relevance in legal institutional reality. When one transfers 
demand deposits in a bank account held in one’s name to a bank account in another’s name, 
for example, the legal system deems a relevant action to have taken place, such as the 
satisfaction of a debt. Legal theory, however, has not done a very good job of mapping this 
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familiar terrain; international private law, for example, puzzles over questions such as ‘Where 
is a bank account?’74 and ‘Where is a debt?’.75 Such questions are acute given the ubiquity of 
digital record-keeping, and aggravated by cloud computing and DLT.  
Fundamentally, cyberspace would be irrelevant if the objects, events, and actions in it were not 
given relevance by the legal system.76 A dollar of commercial bank ‘book money’, a bitcoin, 
and a coin of World of Warcraft gold are the same in many ontological respects. Their data 
structure and manner of storage differ, but they are all constructed purely of data that represents 
relations between actors. The difference is that a legal system positions them differently, ie, 
imposes a different status on them.77  
When we speak of cyberspace in the context of the shadow financial system, we are speaking 
of objects, events, and actions in cyberspace which a legal system positions as ‘real’. An insight 
from the literature of legal pluralism is apposite here. Different legal systems create different 
legal objects upon the same social objects; one legal system will regard a piece of paper as a 
‘deed’, for example, while another may not. In effect, legal status represents a distinct 
ontological layer. For example, a marriage may be valid (exist) as a matter of customary law, 
and may be recognised by some state laws but not by others. Different spheres of legality 
operate at different scales—local, regional, national, transnational, imposing their meanings on 
the social worlds with which they interact.78 In order to say what a certain thing is, it is therefore 
necessary to adopt a ‘law space’ as the place from which to observe it. Our default position is, 
say, that of the official state law of a Member State of the European Union. But transnational 
capital has long created its own sphere of legality, eg the lex mercatoria of the middle ages or 
the customs, standards, and contractual frameworks of the current day, that operate with some 
degree of efficacy in parallel to state law, and the lex financiera that has emerged more 
recently.79  
‘Incorporation’ of a social object into a catalogue of recognised legal objects seems to be a 
fact-driven phenomenon. The law often follows the market; when (enough) market participants 
attribute real world value to a cyber-object, the border is crossed. For example, there are 
instances of national courts treating World of Warcraft artefacts as ‘property’ capable of theft.80 
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While this is contentious in the context of games,81 a functional approach seems sensible when 
considering innovations in digital financial transactions. Whenever events in unregulated 
cyberspace could destabilise the regulated economy of territorial political community, for 
example, it is prima facie a matter of interest to that community’s regulatory authorities. It 
would be foolish to say that an objects does not exist when it poses financial stability risks. For 
example, where a regulated financial entity takes a position in cryptoassets such that it would 
suffer liquidity problems if the USD to Bitcoin exchange rate shifted, the ‘third border’ is 
crossed, even though national regulators may not have taken an official stance on Bitcoin or 
other cryptocurrencies. In this context, the problem of access to lender of last resort or other 
crisis management instruments constitutes, together with the issues of consumer protection and 
dispute resolution (appeal mechanisms), major challenges of the market in cryptoassets and 
Fintech more broadly. 
This border crossing, however, could also be characterised as a ‘land grab’. When an object is 
incorporated, the sovereign recognising it is asserting jurisdiction over a ‘patch’ of cyberspace. 
As noticed above, it would be possible to collapse all three borders conceptually into one, ie, 
the border between the regulated and the unregulated. Indeed, much can be done to enforce the 
first border by extending it to include objects, events and activities that exist in cyberspace. 
This approach has characterized the first wave of responses to cryptoassets.82 
The empire strikes back?  
Cyberspace can be used to evade laws. The use of Bitcoin (for example) to facilitate illegal 
activities is well-documented. But, after the first wave of libertarian literature, scholars began 
to observe that the affordances of digital environments can also enable national governments 
to enforce their laws.83 Devices such as data retention, geo-location and filtering can be 
employed to emulate territorial space in cyberspace and to block or channel Internet traffic (at 
least for less sophisticated users). As Joachim Zekoll observes, such devices not only recreate 
and reinforce national borders, but can be more effective than real world enforcement 
because—harking back to our discussion of Lessig, above—prohibited actions can be 
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automatically rendered impossible in the digital environment. To the extent this occurs, he 
observes, ‘it entails the Balkanisation of the Internet through the instant enforcement of state 
interests with regard to constitutional values, political and economic goals and social 
content.’84 In our view, the goals of consumer protection and financial stability present two 
such goals that could plausibly justify the extension of more robust sovereign claims into 
cyberspace.  
D.G. Post has conceded, in a more recent contribution, that apparently ‘territory-defying’ 
technologies are, paradoxically, making jurisdiction more important than ever. The possibility 
of action at a distance, and the ‘convulsive rescaling’ of the social and economic world it 
causes, challenges the conventional framework of territorial jurisdiction and underscores the 
importance of geo-political power in our (ultimately physical) world. Although many thought 
that national boundaries were about to disappear in the 1990s, Post reflects that currently ‘more 
resources than ever are being diverted to shoring them up.’85 A debate on Internet jurisdiction, 
he predicts, is about to begin in earnest.86 The crux of the debate is the juxta-position of non-
territorial fora for economic activity, on the one hand, and territorial concentrations of politico-
legal power, on the other. He cites C.S. Maier’s observations on the importance of the third 
border in the grand sweep of modern history:  
[The] spread of these new technologies] transforms the major political division of our times into one that 
separates those who envisage their future prospects based on non-territorial markets and the exchange of 
ideas from those who insist that territoriality can be reinvigorated once again as the basis for economic 
and political security—whether by means of provincial regionalism, or supranational organization, or by 
harsher measures of ethnic homogeneity.87 
We are concerned, then, with the changing relations between ‘law’ (as conventionally 
understood through the framework of the territorial nation state) and a political economy that 
is globalising rapidly, not least through developments in ICT.88 These relations again 
problematise conventional assumptions about territoriality and jurisdiction. 
Cyberspace as a source of risk to the financial system 
It is helpful to ground complex discussions, like that around Internet jurisdiction, in a concrete 
problem. The debate takes on particular nuances in the context of financial services, on which 
we focus the rest of this article. The objectives of financial stability and consumer protection 
help to frame the question of jurisdiction over Internet-based financial services and, we 
suggest, delimit the appropriate extent of state intervention in this context. (We leave aside in 
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our discussion in this article other important financial regulatory goals such as market integrity 
or combating money laundering).  
The concept of financial stability has gained in relevance in recent years, although it has a long-
standing tradition in central banking often under other names, such as sound banking. It was 
somewhat ‘rediscovered’ following the GFC. As a goal for financial regulatory authorities, 
however, financial stability is difficult to define and is often more identifiable in its negative 
definition (ie, ‘what is instability?’) than in its positive definition. At base, it is concerned with 
avoiding systemic risk and building systemic resilience; financial stability, systemic risk, 
contagion control, and sound banking are ‘close cousins’. What is clear, though is that financial 
stability complicates border problems because it transcends institutional mandates89 and 
geographical boundaries, thus further challenging the traditional notion of sovereignty. 
Financial stability is indeed a national, regional and international goal; episodes of instability, 
like tsunamis and epidemics, do not respect territorial boundaries. Pace Sheldon and Maurer:  
Systemic risks are for financial market participants what Nessie, the monster of Loch Ness, is for the 
Scots (and not only for them): Everyone knows and is aware of the danger. Everyone can accurately 
describe the threat. Nessie, like systemic risk, is omnipresent, but nobody knows when and where it 
might strike. There is no proof that anyone has really encountered it, but there is no doubt that it exists.90 
In a joint document published by the International Monetary Fund, the Bank for International 
Settlements and the Financial Stability Board in response to a G-20 mandate, systemic risk in 
financial markets is defined as ‘the risk of widespread disruption to the provision of financial 
services that is caused by an impairment of all or parts of the financial system, which can cause 
serious negative consequences for the real economy’.91 Negative externalities (contagion) are 
key to its understanding. Philip Davis has defined systemic risk as a ‘disturbance in financial 
markets which entails unanticipated changes in prices and quantities in credit or asset markets, 
which lead to a danger of failure of financial firms, and which in turn threatens to spread so as 
to disrupt the payments mechanism and capacity of the financial system to allocate capital.’92 
Other definitions also point to the probability of breakdown in the entire financial system, as 
opposed to breakdowns in individual parts or components. According to Hal Scott, systemic 
risk is ‘the risk that a national, or the global, financial system will break down’.93 
                                                     
89 For example, in the US, the post-GFC Dodd-Frank Act 2010 establishes inter alia a Financial Services 
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2016), URL: https://www.imf.org/external/np/g20/pdf/2016/083116.pdf, 4. See also 
https://www.bis.org/publ/othp07.pdf; https://www.imf.org/external/np/pp/eng/2013/061013b.pdf;  
https://www.fsb.org/2011/10/r_111027b/ and https://www.bis.org/publ/cgfs38.pdf 
92 P. Davis, Debt, Financial Fragility and Systemic Risk (Clarendon Press, 1992), 117.  
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While systemic risk is often associated with the contagion effect triggered by default or credit 
risk, in our opinion any risk—including liquidity risk, market risk, legal risk, operational risk—
can grow to systemic proportions when its negative impact extends beyond an individual 
institution and affects or threatens to affect other institutions, leading to a disruption in the 
financial and payments systems and even the economy at large. For example, consider an 
unregulated Internet-based payments provider. If this provider were to experience liquidity 
problems, it could affect users’ ability to meet their obligations with impacts throughout the 
broader (‘real’) economy.  
Central to the idea of systemic risk post-GFC is the concept of Systemically Important 
Financial Institutions (‘SIFI’). SIFIs are entities that are so important for the functioning of a 
financial system that their problems—and, in particular, their failure—can trigger system-wide 
problems, because they are ‘too big to fail’, ‘too interconnected to fail’, or ‘too significant to 
fail’.94 SIFIs present additional challenges to the delimitation of borders because the Internet 
offers unparalleled opportunities for circumventing financial regulations such as those 
identifying and controlling SIFIs.95 As Goodhart and Lastra observe, vulnerability to ‘gaming’ 
is an inherent feature of regulation itself: 
In so far as regulation is effective in forcing the regulated to shift from a preferred to a less desired 
position, it is likely to set up a boundary problem. It is, therefore, a common occurrence, or response, to 
almost any regulatory imposition. A current [2010] example is the proposal to introduce additional 
regulatory controls on systemically important financial intermediaries (SIFIs). If SIFIs are to be 
penalized, there needs, on grounds of equity and fairness, to be some definition, some criteria, of what 
constitutes a SIFI, an exercise with considerable complication.  But once such a definition is established 
and a clear boundary established, there will be an incentive for institutions to position themselves on one 
side or another of that boundary, whichever may seem more advantageous.  Suppose that we started, say 
in a small country, with three banks, each with a third of deposits, and each regarded as [too big to fail], 
and the definition of a SIFI was a bank with over 20% of total deposits.  If each bank then split itself into 
two identical clones of itself, to avoid the tougher regulation, with similar portfolios and interbank 
linkages, would there have been much progress? Similarity can easily generate contagion. Indeed, 
regulation tends to encourage and to foster similarity in behaviour.96 
From this aspect, borders appear almost like a resource that actors can mobilise in both good 
and bad faith.97 Insofar as actors attempt to avoid triggering SIFI regulations, but remain de 
facto of systemic importance, such regulations could in fact increase systemic risk rather than 
mitigating it. The ‘third border’ offers actors new opportunities for structuring transactions and 
relationships to avoid moving into the regulated space. This points, again, to the utility of the 
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borders metaphor to understand not only the need for regulation but the intended and 
unintended impacts of regulation, including substitution flows.  
The definition of a systemically significant financial institution is also dynamic. What is 
systemic today will not necessarily be systemic tomorrow. Indeed, the lists of SIFIs are 
frequently being revised. A new taxonomy is now applicable to those entities that can create 
systemic risk according to their line of financial business (G-SIBs or Global Systemically 
Important Banks and G-SIIs or Global Systemically Important Insurers) and according to their 
relevance nationally or internationally.98 The fact that most SIFIs have a cross-border presence 
and a cross-border dimension to their business calls, in our view, for a cross-border solution 
involving supra-national or international coordination of conventional sovereign states. The third 
border adds a further layer of complexity to the regulatory treatment of SIFIs, since national 
solutions alone will not suffice to prevent and contain systemic risk. However, again, 
cooperation between states logically presupposes and practically relies on national territorial 
jurisdiction.  
The notion of ‘scaling’ is instructive in this context. Harking back to our discussion of Jackson, 
above, part of the question of how risks should be regulated is who should regulate them, and 
one’s answer to this question rests on assumptions one makes about the scale of the relevant 
space. According to Valverde:  
Some risks are thought of as essentially global, others as national, and others yet as local: these shifts in 
scale are incorporated, usually without much discussion, into security strategies. […] By contrast, 
political and legal theory habitually privilege the scale of the nation-state. […] Political and legal theory 
work almost wholly with two scales only, the national and the transnational/global.99 
These assumptions, in turn, directly inform arguments about the proper location of regulation—
where, in effect, the border should be raised. Avoiding the twin risks of Balkanisation and a 
race to the bottom (which encourages jurisdictional arbitrage), we agree that new, hybrid 
modes of governance may need to emerge for the effective and compelling regulation of 
financial services in cyberspace.100   
Jurisdiction in ‘cyber-territories’ 
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Legal systems take a variety of approaches to establishing jurisdiction in cases where the matter 
of a transaction has a connection with more than one jurisdiction. Choice of law rules, for 
example, determine the proper law of a contract or a tort by reference to the nationality and 
residence of the parties involved, the place in which the operative events occurred, and the 
place in which the relevant objects are situated. But these rules evolved in the era of territorial 
jurisdiction—pre-Fintech, Fintech 1.0 and early Fintech 2.0. They do not always apply 
straightforwardly to Fintech 3.0.101 For example, the idea that a bank account has a situs was 
difficult enough in the era of paper book-keeping.102 Things are only more complicated today.  
The ultimate task is to develop a theory of Internet jurisdiction that explains the application of 
law to persons acting in cyberspace and to the ‘natively digital’ objects they act upon. Mindful 
of a metaphor’s limits, the borders metaphor invites a few useful questions. Is cyberspace like 
a newly discovered continent, an America ready to be carved up by existing geo-political 
players? Or is it more like the high seas which are, by their nature, beyond the kind of control 
that makes conventional sovereignty possible? Should conventional sovereigns attempt to 
‘occupy’ cyberspace right up to contiguous and non-overlapping borders, or respect interstitial 
spaces? What role does technological constraint, as opposed to conventional norms, play in the 
governance of this space? Should the emerging normative framework be seen as a ‘pirate code’, 
a modern body of custom like the medieval lex mercatoria, a body of ‘transnational pluralist 
law’, or a branch of international law made by sovereign states?103 What is the importance of 
community; what space do non-state associations occupy in this landscape; and how much 
political ‘weight’ should non-territorial Internet communities be given?  
As a starting point, it is necessary to distinguish between the ‘layers’ of cyberspace, which are 
often neglected in legal analysis. Yochai Benkler observes (i) a physical layer (ie, undersea 
cables, computer servers, and wireless routers), (ii) a logical layer (ie, the rules governing 
access to and use of the network) and (iii) a content layer (ie, the content actually being 
communicated, such as the data packet that constitutes a US dollar or a bitcoin).104 We would 
add a fourth—a social layer105—positioning banking records and bitcoins as ‘real’ assets and 
World of Warcraft gold as ‘game’ assets. The concept of jurisdiction would seem to comprise 
part of this fourth layer, and it interacts with the other layers in different ways. In effect, the 
concept of jurisdiction, when extended to non-spatial artefacts, positions those artefacts as 
objects with ‘real world’ value that the relevant authority has some valid interest in regulating. 
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This is illustrated by the concept of the ‘magic circle’ hiving game activities off from the ‘real 
world’; game money, promises, frauds, etc, are not given the kind of value by state law that 
would require the assertion of jurisdiction over them—at least not until they start to affect non-
game interests.106 
According to M.A. Geist, the concept of jurisdiction comprises three layers, too: (i) the courts 
(and other legal institutions) that could have jurisdiction, (ii) the substantive law that they 
would apply, and (iii) the enforcement of legal rulings in an online environment.107 The 
physical layer of the Internet is most easily brought under territorial jurisdiction; fibre-optic 
cables are physically located somewhere and owned by someone with a home jurisdiction. The 
logic layers and content layers, on the other hand, are less ‘grounded’. The infrastructure of the 
logic layer may be in one state, but the content is accessible by (or targeted towards) users 
resident in another state, leading to a conflicts-type problem. The application of regulations to 
Internet-based financial services, then, should not only be informed by an awareness of the 
layers in any given case, but also the aspects of jurisdiction that are being conceptually 
extended to cover them.  
Surveying the range of solutions in the conventional law, there is no ‘silver bullet’ that will 
solve the Internet jurisdictional problem;108 a combination of approaches is necessary, which 
may evolve over time. A conventional conflicts or international private law approach is 
obviously essential. This allows the courts of one state to assume jurisdiction, but apply the 
norms of another state more appropriate to the matter.109 But, in our view, such an analysis is 
insufficient on its own; there are other important aspects.110 D.J.B. Svantesson has recently 
argued (correctly, in our view) that it is necessary to embrace not only conventional conflicts 
analyses, but international public law analyses, as well. These include, in particular, (i) the 
connection between the state claiming jurisdiction and the Internet-based matter, (ii) a 
legitimate state interest in the matter, and (iii) a balancing of that state’s interest with other 
relevant interests.111  
The potentially disruptive impact of Fintech on conventional notions of sovereignty is 
particularly important in the context of monetary policy. Claus Zimmermann has reviewed the 
conventional treatment of monetary sovereignty, and concludes that it is usually treated as a 
part of the general concept of (territorial) sovereignty that pertains to the rights and obligations 
of states to print money and honour monetary obligations.112 But the concept is broader than 
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this. As Pistor argues, monetary sovereignty is a unique concept that involves a relationship of 
transitivity between overlapping normative, institutional practices. ‘Public money’ (eg, central 
bank issued currency) and financial instruments issued by private entities today ‘form part of 
an integrated, hierarchical money system, both domestically and globally.’113 The domestic 
and global money systems, she argues, are like interlocking balance sheets, in which one 
party’s credit is another’s debit; ‘sovereignty’ in a relationship like this means that a party can 
create the units in which its debts are payable. Sovereignty is reduced (or lost) when a nation 
state assumes obligations in a foreign currency. But it is also reduced whenever one entity (eg 
a bank) can compel another (eg a state) to provide liquidity assistance—for example, to prevent 
contagion spreading through the national economy in a crisis. In our view, this would provide 
a state with a legitimate interest in, for example, asserting a kind (or degree) of ‘sovereign’ 
jurisdiction over an Internet-based payments provider presenting a systemic risk to the national 
economy.  
Combining these insights, a proper approach requires a granular view of cyberspace per se (ie 
looking at each of its physical, logical, and content layers) and an analysis of how each layer 
(i) connects an Internet-based financial object, event or action to the jurisdiction of one or more 
territorial sovereigns, (ii) touches the legitimate interests of one or more territorial sovereigns, 
and (iii) balances these legitimate interests. In the context of financial regulation, we think that 
states’ interests must centre on (i) promoting financial stability and resilience, (ii) consumer 
protection and (iii) dispute settlement. These connecting factors may not apply 
straightforwardly; for example, a Fintech application could be designed specifically to avoid 
certain physical Internet infrastructure, yet still have a strong connection with some jurisdiction 
in virtue of the identity and location of the transacting parties. In other words, what we have 
called the ‘social layer’ of the Internet must be dispositive, because that is the ontological 
domain in which jurisdiction and cyberspace actually interact.  
Four Internets (and a freeriding troll)  
O’Hara and Hall have recently observed ‘four Internets’ emerging.114 The ‘Silicon Valley open 
Internet’ reflects the idealism of the Internet’s creators, who engineered it to be open, with 
transparent standards, portable, extensible and interoperable data and software, able to scale as 
it grows. The ‘Brussels bourgeois Internet’ is protective of privacy and discouraging of bad 
online behavior—even at the cost of innovation.115 A third group, typified by China, strives for 
an ‘authoritarian Internet’ where surveillance and identification technologies help ensure social 
cohesion and security. The ‘commercial Internet’ desired by Washington DC sees online 
resources as private property, whose owners can monetise them and seek market rates for their 
use. Finally, certain states see the openness of the Internet as a vulnerability that can be 
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exploited to further their geo-political projects. These four Internets (and the free rider) co-
exist uneasily. We have not reached an equilibrium, and we need to be prepared for the Internet 
to evolve with the geopolitical ascendancy of one or another faction.116  
These divergent visions reflect different responses to the ‘convulsive rescaling’ of our social 
and economic world and a redefinition of the relation between political economies and legal 
authorities. The so-called ‘California Ideology’ behind the Silicon Valley open Internet, for 
example, is (in broad terms) a product of the ‘collision and synthesis’ of neo-liberalism, 
counter-culture radicalism, and technological determinism.117 Eclectic, it bears hallmarks of 
similarity to diverse conventional views, particularly Austrian School, free-banking, American 
Libertarianism, and the New Left. It combines a New Left anti-corporate ethos and faith in the 
Internet as a forum for new forms of community with a conservative libertarian faith in the 
ability of information technologies to facilitate voluntary exchange between individuals 
outside the sphere of state control.118 Digital authoritarianism, on the other hand, is typified by 
robust assertions of national sovereignty over cyberspace that undermine the notion of 
cyberspace as a situs of international information flows and as a domain of individual privacy. 
It is illustrated in the ‘Great Firewall of China’119 as well as in efforts such as the Shanghai 
Cooperation Organisation through which China, Russia, India, Iran, and others have 
coordinated their Internet security policies to prevent the Internet being used as a site of 
political mobilisation against incumbent politico-legal structures.120 
In a charming investigation from 2001, Viktor Mayer-Schönberger sets out an account of this 
problematic dramatized as a four-act play. His dramatis personae are ‘Legal Authority’ and 
‘Cyberspace’. The stage is spare. ‘Act One: Collision Course’ sees Legal Authority subjugating 
Cyberspace. ‘Act Two: Almost Déjà Vu’ sees the arriviste subjugating Legal Authority. ‘Act 
Three: Separate Lives’ sees the protagonists occupy a common stage but talking past each other 
without meaningful interaction. ‘Act Four: Dialogue and Discourse’ sees the characters 
learning to sing a common tune.121 Along with one’s assumptions about scale (ie where norms 
governing cyberspace ought to be promulgating and enforced), one’s preferred mode of 
interaction shapes one’s preferred regulatory landscape.  
Outlook: the governance of cyberspace and Fintech regulation  
It is not always straightforward to apply existing regulatory frameworks to new technologies; 
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regulated activities are defined in legal instruments that typically predate the technologies 
driving the Fintech revolution, and some of these instruments have strong path-dependency 
effects that potentially make regulation by analogic application sub-optimal. Although 
principles-based regulatory frameworks can be flexible and prima facie technology neutral, 
Julia Black has observed, following their failure in the GFC, that such frameworks are subject 
to confounding factors including problems of interpretation, communication, compliance, 
enforcement, internal management, ethics, and trust.122 Indeed, principles-based regulation 
may not be as technology-neutral as intended; it may presuppose categories of object and action 
that do not capture innovations fully.123 As Reed observes, ‘technology neutrality’ means a 
number of different things.124 Truly technology-neutral drafting is no mean feat, and it is 
sometimes better to draft laws to be technology-specific until the potential uses of the 
technology mature.125  
The crux of the problem of Fintech regulation is the relation between the conceptual notion of 
risk management and the institutional dimension of ‘market regulation’ or ‘state intervention’ 
in financial applications of novel technology.126 This relation is informed not only by the 
geopolitical state of play, but also the shape of the market, for example the current dominance 
of Internet-based platform providers. The global community struggles within the Westphalian 
paradigm to govern use of the atmosphere, the poles, or the high seas, or to tackle pandemic 
disease —despite unprecedented international cooperation in all of these areas in the decades 
since WWII. Moreover, the position of the nation state vis-à-vis private associations and 
business organisations has changed dramatically in the past decades; European capital markets 
and corporate governance regulation, for example, were described by Zambunsen in 2009 as a 
‘semi-autonomous’, transnational legal field that incorporated ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ law norms 
promulgated by a ‘panoply of public and private actors’.127 What Josh Fairfield observes of 
gaming communities might pertain to financial services, too: ‘It seems unlikely that real-world 
nations will recognise online communities as separate and co-equal sovereigns’, he says, ‘[b]ut 
it is likely that real-world courts will seriously consider the norms generated by online 
communities as courts take up the task of applying law to virtual worlds.’128 While we do not 
believe that the Internet will or should spell the death of the Westphalian nation state,129 we 
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expect—and welcome—both cooperation between nation states and hybrid public/private 
norm-creation in response to financial stability risks originating in cyberspace.  
With the benefit of these insights, we now make a few observations on the regulation of 
Fintech.  
First, the regulation of Fintech would appear to be another chapter in a much larger struggle by 
the nation state, as one form of geo-political ordering, for regulatory primacy over transnational 
actors and economic processes that unfold within and beyond the borders it projects.130 In the 
context of finance, this struggle has often been catalysed by new technologies. Thus, as novel 
as any financial technology is, it is important to remember that many of these questions have 
arisen before.  
Secondly, an effective regulatory regime for Fintech might not resemble the ideal type of 
financial regulation in previous decades. As Zambunsen observed of the GFC, the globalisation 
of corporate activity and finance worked against attempts to ‘re-domesticate’ corporate 
governance into the contained political economies of nation-states. He argued instead for a 
‘transnational’ corporate governance regulatory framework131 embracing regional and 
international legal harmonization and regulatory cooperation, soft law such as standards, 
industry self-regulation, and other hybrid forms of norm-creation and enforcement. Two sub-
points follow from this. First, the difficulty of policing the third border speaks to regional and 
international cooperation. The expansion of harmonised ‘law spaces’, and the increased 
cooperation between local regulators that this implies, effectively reduces the number of 
territorial jurisdictions and the number of divergent rule-sets between them. By cooperating, 
states can prevent a race to the bottom and ensure that those posing a systemic risk to any 
financial system can be effectively regulated. Secondly, we think that national regulators 
should be open to the idea of working through self-regulatory efforts in cyberspace. This does 
not mean that cyberspace should be recognised as a jurisdiction in its own right. But where 
actors are willing to establish zones of legality in cyberspace, national regulators should work 
with rather than against them. These two processes could be mutually complementary: self-
regulation could occur under the aegis of existing international cooperation that can claim an 
element of international legal authority.132  
Financial globalization has been fostered not only by financial innovation and the technological 
revolution but also by the integration and liberalisation of markets and the mobility of people 
and capital. This calls into question the primacy that national regulators continue to place on 
national borders (what we have referred to in this article as the second border). It also calls into 
question the evolution of the global financial market, which is not homogenous but resembles 
a radial web with multiple interconnections and linkages, in which a few players dominate the 
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scene. The dichotomy between global finance and domestic financial regulation, which 
features prominently in the work of Emilios Avgouleas, Douglas Arner, and Rosa Lastra133 has 
given rise to the predominance of soft law and soft power, in the absence of ‘hard’ international 
financial law and ‘formal’ international financial regulators (with the IMF and the BIS having 
a limited mandate in this regard). The reliance on soft law and soft power,134 highlights the 
complexities of regulating Fintech, but also points to a potential solution. Soft law is law, after 
all, and fills a vacuum. Indeed, the role of soft law instruments in internet financial governance 
ought to be further developed as part of a new ‘financial lex cryptographica’, including ‘top-
down’ rules or principles (standards issued by intergovernmental or official entities), ‘bottom-
up’ rules issued by private actors, associations and market entities (uniform rules and standards, 
voluntary codes of conduct, codes of practice, etc) which are also an exercise in self-regulation, 
and rules ‘encoded’ in Fintech systems themselves.135 
Thirdly, territorial sovereigns retain leverage over those acting in cyberspace to the extent that 
human beings must live somewhere. Actions in cyberspace that are outright illegal, ie 
fraudulent or dishonest, can be more easily enforced when the human actors behind the scheme 
have lives and assets in the jurisdiction. It is not always straightforward to connect an individual 
in physical space to actions in cyberspace, just as it is possible (without the use of Fintech) to 
obfuscate the link between a taxpayer and their wealth through the interpolation of companies 
and trusts, for example. But most innovators are implicated in the conventional legal and 
financial system and this renders some of the cyber-sovereignty rhetoric otiose. We would also 
add that, although we have used cryptoassets as an example in this article, that focus can give 
a false impression. Most Fintech start-ups are conventionally ‘rational actors’ and often seek 
regulation. Indeed, the long-term challenge may come from large technology firms engaging 
in financial services, rather than techno-libertarian start-ups. The larger challenge in the long 
term can be seen if we look to recent developments in China, where telecommunications and 
e-commerce giants have established financial services ecosystems, replete with an established, 
captive user base. Facebook’s Libra proposal provides another example on the horizon.136 Long 
term, these concerns may be more challenging for the existing financial regulatory system than 
coalitions of banks and start-up technology partners.137 
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Fourthly, to the extent that the physical layers of cyberspace rest in a jurisdiction, the entities 
that operate its infrastructure (eg, Internet service providers) can be co-opted into the regulatory 
framework.138 There are limits to the extent to which regulators can legitimately require 
intermediaries to enforce their rules in cyberspace;139 this is, in our view, one of the main 
contexts in which different visions of the Internet will compete. Contributions to the normative 
debate about the proper degree of openness in the context of consumer protection and systemic 
risk will be important in the coming years.  
Fifthly, regulators may need to use enhanced technology to govern cyberspace. Most 
innovation in regulation and supervision technology (so-called ‘Regtech’ and ‘Suptech’) to 
date has occurred on the side of regulated or supervised entities, rather than regulators or 
supervisors—in particular, tools for digitising compliance and reporting processes to increase 
efficiency.140 We would echo calls for an approach combining data, digital identity, and 
regulation that goes beyond digitising analogue-era processes and exploring the affordances of 
novel ICT for regulators.141 In a sense, the emerging ‘financial lex cryptographica’ might 
contain technically-encoded norms that are intended to enforce state regulation rather than 
displace it. One approach might be an extension of ‘sandboxes’142 beyond temporary testing 
environments to permanent sites within cyberspace, provided by territorial sovereigns, from 
which Fintech providers can access nationally regulated financial markets—subject to built-in 
(automated) monitoring and control. This could comprise an element of both territorial and 
personal jurisdiction (or their analogues).143  
CONCLUSION 
This article has presented an extended borders metaphor, teasing out what is meant by 
‘regulated’ and ‘unregulated’, examining the notion of territorial jurisdiction, and exploring 
the ontology of cyberspace in order to understand how current innovations might challenge 
financial regulation practically and conceptually. In particular, we have considered whether it 
is worthwhile to think expressly in terms of a third border between the ‘real world’ financial 
system and ‘cyberspace’. The ultimate question is always whether a certain action is regulated 
in a jurisdiction. However, it is in our view worthwhile to introduce a third border into the 
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model. The first border highlights the challenges posed by unregulated entities engaging in 
regulated activities (or regulated entities engaging in unregulated activities) whether within a 
jurisdiction or across jurisdictions; the second border highlights the challenges posed by 
entities transacting across jurisdictions in ways that potentially circumvent or undermine 
national financial regulations; and what we have identified as a the third border usefully 
highlights the challenges posed by entities that either intentionally use the Internet to avoid 
national regulations, or use it to deliver financial services in ways that makes regulation 
practically or conceptually difficult.  
This extended borders metaphor provided a perspective from which to consider current debates 
about the role of nation states in governing Internet-based activities that may not take place 
(straightforwardly) within their jurisdiction, but which might affect their national financial and 
economic system. The map is not the territory, and the utility of a model is ultimately assessed 
by reference to its explanatory purpose.144 For the purpose of charting the future course of the 
emerging ‘financial lex cryptographica’ and conceptualising its relation to national law, we 
think that the perspective provided by the borders metaphor is useful. Though it was beyond 
our present ambitions to present a complete theory of Internet jurisdiction, we hope that our 
contribution to the ontology of cyberspace in the context of financial services has helped to 
shed some light on the ‘digital real’. The result is a more nuanced vision of both domains, with 
a third border holding heuristic value but not necessarily reflecting intuitive notions about the 
digital versus physical phenomena. This, we hope, will help to anchor the notion of financial 
stability in a proper jurisprudential groundwork for further development as new challenges 
arise for national regulators.  
We are still some way off a non-controversial theory of how computer networks that represent 
‘domains’ of interaction fit within the conventional system of territorial sovereignty. It seems 
fair to say that some of cyberspace’s properties would be lost from view if we simply reduced 
it to its physical layer. Likewise, to treat cyberspace as a full-blown territory would seem to 
make too much of what is, at base, a sound metaphor—but still a metaphor. There are 
competing values at stake, including the need to foster beneficial innovation and preserve the 
Internet as a free space for human interaction, that demand special consideration. We accept—
as we assume most scholars of law and finance would—the value of a free and internationally 
open Internet, provided certain conditions are met. Both over-heavy governance of the Internet 
by states and an overly laissez-faire approach by nation states could lead to problems—the 
former to Balkanisation behind national firewalls145 (likely with thriving black markets), and 
the latter to a ‘Wild West’ in which important public interests such as consumer protection and 
financial stability are neglected.  
We may thus have to change the way we conceptualise and enforce jurisdiction as more of our 
social reality moves online. The future of cyberspace governance is, for now, open; in our view, 
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Fintech will continue to provide an important context for mapping its borders. Our preferred 
outcome is Mayer-Schönberger’s Act Four, and our predisposition is towards Brussels’ 
‘bourgeois Internet’. Sovereign states still have a unique and irreplaceable role that must be 
reflected in the emerging law of Internet jurisdiction. But, we think, there is a place for both 
supra-national cooperation and user-generated ordering in the Internet. In terms of the former, 
we would especially stress harmonisation at the European level. We would also stress the role 
of standards and other ‘soft law’ instruments. In terms of the latter, we remain open to the role 
of private and quasi-public actors in Internet governance, particularly in the formation of soft 
law instruments.  
Wherever the next systemic shockwaves are going to originate, we would close with the same 
warning Goodhart and Lastra made in 2010. Regulation usually follows crises counter-
cyclically. While it is undesirable to stifle innovation, it is even less desirable to allow systemic 
risks to proliferate below the radar and to act only once they eventuate.  
